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FOREWORD
CASELOAD GROWTH: STRUGGLING TO KEEP
PACE
Thomas J. Meskill*
INTRODUCTION

Each year the Brooklyn Law Review devotes one issue to a
review of the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. The contributors to this annual issue describe and comment in detail on the court's decisions affecting
particular areas of the law. In preparing the Foreword for this
year's Second Circuit Review, I thought that the reader would
be interested in learning how the court deals with the current
demands of the ever-increasing caseload from which the opinions analyzed in this issue are derived. I will attempt to accomplish this task as succinctly as possible, touching on some of the
causes of the expanding workload and on our attempts to cope
with it.
OVERVIEW

The number of appeals filed in our court has continued to
increase over the years. The filings ebb and flow but during the
sixteen years that I have been a member of the court the trend
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:299

generally has been upward. The number of appeals filed in the
year ending July 1, 1975, was 1,739. Last year the number was
3,424, an increase of almost 100 percent. In that same period the
number of authorized judges only has increased from nine to
thirteen. In spite of this, we have managed to clear the calendar
in almost every year. By this I mean we have disposed of as
many cases each year as were filed during that year. Also notable
is the Second Circuit's performance relative to the other circuits.
In nearly every year during this sixteen-year period, we have established the best record of any circuit court for disposing of
cases expeditiously. Some of the credit for this performance belongs to the senior judges on our court who still perform valuable judicial service and without whose help we could not keep
pace with the ever-increasing workload. We have also been
blessed with the help of visiting judges from other circuits and
district judges from our own circuit who have sat on our panels
by special designation of our Chief Judge. Additionally, in response to these workload demands, we have increased the number of panels that hear appeals. As a result, active judges on our
court have been sitting more frequently than ever before and
each panel has been hearing more cases. Despite these extraordinary efforts, we have failed to keep pace with the rapid growth
in the number of appeals this year.
Why the Increased Filings?
The most frequently offered explanation for the increase in
court activity at all levels is the "litigious nature" of our contemporary society. A close second in the blame department seems to
be "too many lawyers." I disagree with both assessments. The
federal caseload has been fueled in part by an avalanche of
drug-related crimes and a doubling of bankruptcy filings in the
last five years. Much of the increase in litigation, however, stems
directly from legislative initiatives of the United States Congress. In particular, congressional initiatives such as OSHA, 29
U.S.C. § 651-678, ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461, Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17, as well as much of the environmental
legislation, have spurred litigation in the federal courts. Indeed,
our elected representatives often intentionally increase the business of the courts. Example: When Congress passed the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, it sought to encourage
individuals and small corporations to stand up for their rights
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when they felt they had been wronged or unfairly treated by the
federal government. The Act conferred on private litigants, who
prevailed in suits against the United States, the opportunity to
recover costs and attorneys' fees from the government. In adopting this legislation, Congress plainly anticipated that an increase
in litigation would occur. It did. Naturally, much of this increased litigation finds its way into the appellate courts. Often,
in fact, by the time such cases reach us, the sole issue on appeal
is the question of attorneys' fees.
Even when Congress does not intend or even anticipate that
certain legislation will increase our caseload, the adoption of new
laws often has that effect. For instance, when Congress passed
the Sentencing Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 3551-3856, its purpose
was not to encourage criminal appeals. I seriously doubt that
Congress believed the Act would produce much appellate work.
Indeed, it was generally understood that if a district judge sentenced a defendant within the Guidelines there could be no appeal of the sentence. I am certain that our representatives in
Washington would be surprised to learn that during a ten-month
period last year almost one-third of all of the criminal appeals in
our circuit were exclusively appeals of the sentences imposed after a guilty plea. These are only a few examples of congressionally created sources of the increase in our workload. There are
others I need not mention to make my point.
The workloads of both the district courts and the courts of
appeals are also impacted adversely by questions raised by federal legislation but seldom answered in the language of the statute itself. We necessarily spend much of our time examining federal statutes. Unless we conclude that the statute in question
violates the Constitution, we apply the statute to the facts of the
case. In construing" statutes, we seek to discover and to implement congressional intent. In 1988 alone, according to a December 15, 1989 report by the Federal Bar Council Committee on
Second Circuit Courts, federal courts discussed congressional intent in at least 1,516 cases. I have no figures for recent years, but
I have no reason to believe that the frequency of that subject is
on a downward trend. Unfortunately, the search for congressional intent is often in vain.
Anyone reading our published opinions and those of other
circuits will see the words "silent," "scant" and "inconclusive"
over and over again in courts' discussions of the legislative his-
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tory of particular statutes. Judges spend valuable judicial resources trying to determine what Congress meant by what it
said, resources that could profitably be devoted to other matters.
Attempts to Deal with the Problem
In order to determine the budgetary impact of new legislation on the judiciary, the Analytic Support Branch of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts prepares a judicial impact statement for the Budget Committee for the United
States Courts. These judicial impact statements influence the judiciary's request for funds from the Congress. Indeed, they often
reach conclusions different from the Congressional Budget Office's estimates on the same legislation. The latter often projects
a savings while the former projects additional pressures on judicial resources. But this is an institutional problem with which we
will have to live. There are, however, steps that can be taken
which will serve the congressional purpose of bringing about desired change without adding unnecessarily to the workload of
the federal judiciary.
The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended on December 23, 1989,' that a checklist be created for use by Congress
regarding:
during the drafting of bills to encourage statements
2
limitations;
of
statute
(1)the appropriate
(2)whether a private cause of action is contemplated;
(3)whether preemption of state law is intended;
(4)the definition of key terms;
(5)the mens rea requirement in criminal statutes;
(6)severability; and
(7)whether the new bill repeals or otherwise voids previous
legislation.
Because these frequently raised issues are seldom resolved
in the legislation itself or even in the legislative history, we
judges have to divine answers by analogizing to other statutes or

Federal Courts Study Committee, Tentative Recommendations for Public Comment 135-36 (Dec. 22, 1989), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTTE. WORKING PAPERS AND SuRCOMmrrTEE REPORTS (July 1, 1990).
1 Section 313 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 added a new section, § 1658,
1

to Chapter M of Title 28 providing a four-year statute of limitations for civil actions
accruing under Acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658
(Supp. 1991).
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on occasion by resorting to little short of guesswork. Naturally
not all judges and not all circuits come up with the same answers to these questions, and the ultimate answer often remains
in doubt until it is provided by the already overburdened United
States Supreme Court.
When we are unsure of a district judge's reasoning, we can
remand for clarification. Unfortunately, we do not have the same
avenue open to us when interpreting the language of a statute.
We understand the reluctance of a representative or senator to
be too specific when drafting legislation. And we recognize that
it is relatively easy to gain support for legislation that has a popular purpose. By speaking in specific as opposed to general
terms, however, legislators run-the risk of losing the support of
their colleagues and their constituents. This is because specific
statutory language enables others more fully to appreciate the
negative consequences of any given proposal. Regrettably, by
opting for vagueness, Congress leaves it to the courts to come up
with the answers, answers we are often unsure of but answers we
must give if we are to decide cases. As you might expect, the
answers we offer often displease the congressional sponsors of
the legislation.
One thing is certain, leaving serious questions of congressional intent open for judicial determination substantially adds
to our workload and consumes precious judicial resources unnecessarily. It also runs the risk of undercutting congressional goals.
Attempts to Respond

I wish to note, however, that Congress has not been unmindful of our needs where the number of judgeships is concerned. The same may be said for the logistical support Congress gives to the courts. New appellate judgeships have been
created for our court whenever they have been requested. Funds
were appropriated for a third law clerk for all active appellate
judges in 1980 and for a second secretary in 1981. We have been
supplied with hi-tech equipment such as computers and fax machines to help increase our productivity and speed the judicial
process. But judging is still a thoughtful, deliberative process, a
distinctly human endeavor. We are not machines. We cannot
keep up with an ever-increasing workload by revving up our
thought processes.
Opinion writing is also a time-consuming endeavor. A judge
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is necessarily limited in the number of signed opinions that can
be written in a year. For that reason, we dispose of many appeals by summary order. In an average year we dispose of about
half of our argued cases in this manner. Summary orders are
brief statements of our decisions directed only to the parties.
The orders are by their nature terse and conclusory. They contain a caveat that they are not to be cited in any other case. The
practice of disposing of appeals by summary order has been criticized by some counsel who feel that the time they invested in
the appeal and the expense to their client merit more in the way
of an end product. This reaction is understandable. On the other
hand, our practice is efficient and we believe that with our heavy
workload, the practice is necessary.
We do publish an opinion whenever we reverse the decision
being appealed. We also publish an opinion when we affirm a
decision under review if any member of the panel believes one is
appropriate. Moreover, if a single judge on the panel believes
that any jurisprudential purpose will be served by publishing, we
publish. The questions we ask are, will a published opinion in
this case be helpful to the bench or bar generally or will it add
anything to the established law of the circuit? If the answer to
either questions is yes, we publish. Our policy naturally results
in fewer published opinions. I would hope that those who have
to purchase each new volume of the Federal Reporter would find
considerable merit in our approach.
In spite of all of our efforts to keep up with the caseload, we
are still losing some ground. Enlarging the court is not an easy
answer to the workload problem. It takes a long time to fill a
vacancy on the circuit court. Also, we currently do not have adequate chambers space in the Foley Square Courthouse for all of
our active judges.
Our Chief Judge has appointed a Case Management Committee to study the workloads of other circuits. We are always
anxious to learn from others. One of our practices under review
is allowing oral argument in all appeals except those brought by
incarcerated pro se prisoners. Our circuit stands alone in this
regard. Other circuits limit those instances in which oral argument is available to certain specified appeals.
We, however, do severely limit the time each side is allowed
for oral argument. Because we read the briefs before hearing argument, we do not want counsel to expend valuable time on the
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background facts of the case. It is amazing how much persuasive
argument can be made in five or ten minutes by competent appellate advocates. Experienced counsel will get right to the
point, discussing the legal issues involved and not waste time
telling us what we already know. These tight time limits are necessary if we are to hear as many appeals per sitting session as we
do now.
Some circuits have screening committees that decide which
cases will be allowed oral argument and which will have to submit on their briefs. There have been suggestions that we do the
same or that we at least deny all pro se appellants the privilege
of oral argument. Experience has shown that most of these appeals are without merit and many are frivolous. Personally, I
hope that we can continue to find time for oral argument in all
cases, even those we consider frivolous after reading the briefs.
Even these cases offer a surprise once in a while. If we must
abandon our present policy on oral argument, I would hope that
the decision to deny oral argument would be based on the briefs,
the issues and the record on appeal, and not on the status of the
advocate.
CONCLUSION

We do our best to carry out our appellate function in an
expeditious fashion realizing that our first responsibility is to decide the appeal before us. Because of the increased workload we
have had to make adjustments in our practice, tradeoffs, if you
will. We undoubtedly will have to continue to make changes in
the way we function as a court. In doing so, we can only hope
that these changes will not erode the quality of justice that litigants have a right to expect from a federal appellate court.

